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Abstract: In this paper, we deal with the complex relationship connecting inequality to innovation, 
and the ways through which public investment can affect it. We first stress that inequality and 
innovation may interact in many different ways. The positive relation that part of the economic 
theory often assumes to exist between (initially) rising inequality and improving innovation 
performances emerges as only one among many other far less virtuous dynamic trajectories. We 
then analyze the specific case of the US. We put emphasis on the possible perverse effects that the 
financialization of the US economy may have on the inequality-innovation nexus. We note that 
the US developmental State - very often neglected by the economic literature - can effectively 
mitigate such undesirable outcomes. According to our interpretation of recent developments in the 
US economy, the widespread belief in the positive pro-innovation effects of fierce cutthroat 
remuneration systems may prove to be ungrounded.  
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1. The complex relationship between innovation and inequality 
 
In the last decades, a heterogeneous body of literature has developed trying to assess the existence 
of a direct link between inequality and innovation and between public investment and innovation. 
As for the first point, some authors focus on how innovation affects inequality. Their findings are 
conflicting at the very least. Antonelli and Gehringer (2013) find that higher innovation 
performances (as measured by patent counts) reduce income inequality as captured by the Gini 
index. According to them, innovation reduces income inequality because it fosters productivity 
and economic growth, so that wages increase and rentiers’ income decreases (due to a larger 
available capital stock). Second, in the long run a highly innovative economic environment reduces 
inequality by increasing competitive pressures on good markets, then squeezing the duration and 
amount of quasi-rents accruing to innovators.  
This evidence notwithstanding, Antonelli and Gehringer logic can be easily reversed. 
Aghion (2002) and Acemoglu (2002) claim that the skill-based nature of (process) innovations 
introduced in the last decades has been the main driver of increasing wage and income inequality. 
More in general, in developing countries innovation also lead to the structural change of the 
economy, thus initially increasing inequality as a modern highly productive industrial sector 
emerges alongside traditional low-productivity activities.1   
The picture gets even more complicated if one thinks that the innovation-inequality nexus 
does not run one way. There exist sound theoretical reasons to believe that inequality feedbacks 
on innovation through several channels. A long-standing strand of literature claims that higher 
income and wealth inequality are required in order to stimulate innovation (Lazear and Rosen, 
1981; Lippmann, Davis and Aldrich, 2005). Acemoglu et al. (2012) argue that the US “cutthroat” 
                                                          
1 This is the logic behind the dualistic development model proposed by Arthur Lewis. According to Lewis (1954, p. 56), 
“Development must be [initially] inegalitarian because it does not start in every part of the economy at the same time”. 
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remuneration system is somehow necessary to push ahead the technology frontier and trigger off 
radical innovations. In a sense, they build their model on the theory of “varieties of capitalism” 
originally put forward by Hall and Soskice (2001), according to which radical innovations are 
more likely to be introduced in liberal market-based and relatively unequal economies than in 
cooperative more equalitarian systems.2 Hopkin, Lapuente and Moller (2014) provide empirical 
evidence at odds with the supposedly pro-innovation properties of cutthroat remuneration systems. 
Taking into account OECD countries, they show that highly equitable social systems like 
Scandinavian economies perform better than the US if innovation performances are measured by 
the “Global Innovation Index” (GII).3 Hall and Soskice (2001), and Acemoglu at al. (2012) focus 
their analyses on industrialized economies. Weinhold and Nair-Reichert (2009) analyze a larger 
sample also including emerging and backward economies. They conclude that a more equitable 
income distribution is positively (rather than negatively) correlated to innovation via its positive 
effects on the functioning of domestic institutions. Some other works compare the successful 
development experience of newly industrialized East Asian countries with respect to lagging-
behind Latin American economies. A more equal income and wealth distribution in East Asian 
countries has favored human capital formation, technological knowledge accumulation, structural 
change and, finally, innovation (Arocena and Sutz, 2003). On the contrary, strong élites and 
polarized income and wealth concentration in Latin America have contributed to create an 
unfavorable economic environment characterized by structural inertia, persistently low R&D 
efforts, and disappointing innovative performances (Cimoli and Rovira, 2008). 
As for the role of public investment in supporting and steering innovation, the economic 
literature has extensively stressed how, in the US, government-funded military-related R&D 
activities eventually had significant spill-over effects on the civil sector of the economy, very often 
                                                          
2 See Taylor (2004), and Akkermans, Castaldi and Los (2009) for a critique of the “varieties of capitalism” theory.  
3 See the Global Innovation Index website at https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/content.aspx?page=GII-Home. 
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supporting economic recovery from slumps and counteracting long-run productive declines (see 
Cypher, 1987). Mazzucato (2013) takes inspiration from such a literature and stresses the 
entrepreneurial role often played by public institutions rather than private agents. According to 
Mazzucato, a significant amount of private sectors’ innovations eventually came to light thanks to 
previous direct State engagement in path-breaking innovations. In several cases, State intervention 
did not fix any market failure, but rather put effort in research on a potentially revolutionary 
technology that the private sector would never take into consideration because of the high risks at 
stake. State intervention often created profit and “value-extraction” opportunities that had been 
eventually exploited by private actors (Lazonick and Mazzucato, 2013). 
Our work does not intend to add another piece to the already largely inconclusive empirical 
literature on inequality and innovation. Our attempt is rather to build a simple theoretical 
framework in order to capture at least part of the several different ways through which inequality, 
innovation and public investment may interact, and possibly lead to radically different 
development paths. In this sense, our paper primarily aims at stressing that there is not a unique 
and universal law connecting innovation to inequality, and vice versa. According to a well-
established concept in institutionalist economics4, the way inequality and innovation feedback 
among each other, and shape the development process, is country-specific and context-specific. 
Such specificity induces different countries to follow different path-dependent virtuous or perverse 
development trajectories leading to not-a-priori-foreseeable development outcomes. The first part 
of our paper tries to conceptualize the high degree of cross-country heterogeneity that characterizes 
the relation between inequality and innovation, and the ensuing development process.    
                                                          
4 See O’Hara (2002) on the central role of path-dependency, cumulative causation, history and institutional peculiarities in the 
economic analysis of Veblen, as well as of other non-neoclassical economists such as Myrdal and Kaldor. See Hall and Ludwing 
(2010) on Veblen’s rejection of any neoclassical-type convergence unavoidably leading to a “meliorative trend in the course of 
events”. See Cypher (2015) on Celso Furtado’s historically contextualized analysis of the peculiar underdevelopment process 
afflicting Latin American countries.       
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Secondly, but in relation with the previous point, our work also tries to give a simple representation 
of the peculiar innovation and development pattern that has characterized the US in the last three 
decades. We provide an alternative story with respect to the well-know idea according to which 
the high (and increasing) level of inequality registered in the US since mid 1970s is a sort of 
necessary although bitter pre-requisite to spur innovation. In alternative to the perspective put 
forward by Acemoglu et al. (2012) among others, we show how high innovation and rising 
inequality in the US can be totally uncorrelated, and actually result as coincidental consequences 
of third omitted variables, i.e. past and present committed public efforts in the R&D sector, and 
more recent institutional changes in the financial sphere of the economy. In this sense, our narrative 
of the current US innovation-inequality model casts serious doubts on the sustainability of such 
new institutional arrangements, as well as on the asserted virtues of unequal but (allegedly) more 
innovative liberal market-driven economies. 
This work is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our simple inequality-innovation 
theoretical framework. We show how the many different context-specific forces shaping the 
relationship between inequality and innovation may lead to radically different development paths. 
Section 3 provides a simple representation of the current US inequality-innovation pattern, which 
is alternative to the “more-inequality-feeds-more-innovation” paradigm pinpointed by Acemoglu 
et al. (2012). Section 4 concludes and discusses some implications for future research that emerge 
from our analysis. 
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2. A simple theoretical framework on inequality-innovation clusters and 
heterogeneous development paths            
 
In Figure 1, we plot the 2012 values of the GII index5 (horizontal axis) with the most recent data 
available of the Gini Index (vertical axis) for a sample of 67 countries. What emerges is a snapshot 
of current huge cross-country differences in terms of innovation-inequality patterns, and of the 
lack of a clear relationship between inequality and innovation at worldwide level. Yet, what Figure 
1 also suggests is the existence of a sort of country clustering around a number of sub-groups. In 
the bottom-left part of Figure 1, lie some backward countries where persistent difficulties to ignite 
a sustained development process and scarce innovation capacities are associated to basically low 
levels of inequality, at least with respect to emerging and middle-income economies. Most of Latin 
American economies lie in the top-left section of the graph. Although innovation performances 
remain disappointing, inequality reaches much higher levels, actually the highest worldwide 
(together with South Africa, “SA”). Finally, most of the developed (European) economies are 
clustered in the bottom-right section of Figure 1. In this case, high domestic innovation capacities 
combine with the lowest level of inequality worldwide. South Korea belongs to this group too, 
whereas a fast-growing emerging economy like China lies in the middle. In terms of innovation, 
it performs better than the least developed countries and other developing economies, Latin 
American ones in particular. However, inequality in China is still much higher than in most 
developed countries. Following Taylor (2004) and Hopkin, Lapuente and Moller (2014), Figure 1 
confirms the peculiarity of the USA among the set of developed nations. The USA belongs to the 
group of the most innovative economies worldwide, even though it is not the most innovative 
                                                          
5 See Table A.1 in Appendix A for the full list of countries reported in Figure A.1.  
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according to the 2012 GII index. US inequality, however, is much more pronounced than that 
observed in other similarly developed economies. 
 
[Figure 1] 
 
One could reply to our interpretation of Figure 1 that such cross-country differences may depend 
on the different level of development characterizing the economies taken into account. 
Nonetheless, a broad historical perspective on development successes and failures may confirm 
that such differences are not the mere result of transitory phases of a common development 
process, but rather signs of hysteresis in the evolution of the variables at stake, and of the 
institutions that contribute to determine them. This is the case of the countries entering the bottom-
left group in Figure 1, most of them included in the UN list of the least developed countries since 
the beginning of the 1970s and apparently stuck in a long-lasting poverty trap. The same can be 
said for Latin American countries, where high inequality, unsatisfactory innovation performances, 
and evidence of an uncompleted development processes stand out as widely recognized facts.6 
European continental and Northern countries, finally, constantly perform as highly innovative 
developed economies with strong welfare systems and low inequality levels. In a way, Figure 1 
may be seen as a perhaps rough proof that the relationship between inequality and innovation could 
be affected by the kind of institutional path-dependence first development economists identified 
as source of diverging development paths, and that new inequality-innovation patterns may emerge 
as a consequence of institutional and structural breaks.   
Such a wide variety in cross-country inequality-innovation patterns makes cross-country 
empirical analyses hardly effective. Therefore, let try to think about a theoretical framework that 
                                                          
6 See Palma (2011, 2014) on the persistence of extremely high levels of inequality in Latin America and South Africa.  
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may help to describe at least part of the several ways through which innovation and inequality 
coevolve and shape the development process.   
As for the effects innovation can have on inequality, let take inspiration from some of the 
original path-breaking theories in the field of development economics. Indeed, following Lewis 
(1954), Kuznets (1955) and Furtado (1964) among others, innovations in poor economies initially 
consist in the emergence of a few modern (more productive and technology advanced) productive 
activities into largely pre-industrial and pre-capitalist economic systems. Depending on the 
institutional environment they operate in, and on the ensuing incentives/constraints to productively 
invest their rewards, emerging entrepreneurs/innovators can reinvest profits and trigger off a self-
sustaining process of capital accumulation, improving productivity and even rising incomes. At 
the incipient stages of the development process, this mechanism is likely to determine an increase 
in wealth and income disparity.7 Nevertheless, if strong and widespread enough, this process will 
boost economic development and the structural change of the economy. The accumulation and 
diffusion of technological knowledge, the adoption of better production techniques, the emergence 
of wider innovation opportunities, and the ensuing traverse towards middle-advanced stages of 
development eventually alter the innovation-inequality nexus. A negative link now takes form. 
This shift in the innovation-inequality pattern hinges on technological spillovers from industry to 
agriculture, the changing balance of bargaining power between antagonist factors taking part in 
the production process, and on the spread of innovation opportunities that makes markets more 
competitive and dynamic, monopolistic positions weaker and monopolistic rents short-lived. 
Equation (1) tries to formalize such a development trajectory in the simplest way possible: 
 
                                                          
7 According to Kanbur (2012, p. 12), “the dynamics of development identified by Kuznets and Ahluwalia continue to be present in 
the actual experience of individual countries, and are being confirmed by the time series evidence that has accumulated since the 
work of these two pioneers”. See Bresser-Pereira (2014) for a historical analysis of the evolution of inequality across the different 
stages of capitalism development. Note his point on the initial increase in inequality due to the move to capital-using techniques.     
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𝑖𝑞𝑡+1 = 𝑓 (𝑖𝑛𝑡⏟
+/−
)               (1) 
 
With   
𝜕𝑖𝑞𝑡+1
𝜕𝑖𝑛𝑡
> 0 if int < 𝑖?̅?;  
𝜕𝑖𝑞𝑡+1
𝜕𝑖𝑛𝑡
< 0 if int > 𝑖?̅? 
 
In equation (1), we assume a time lag to separate the occurrence of innovations (int) from their 
effects on inequality (iqt+1) to emerge. In addition to this, 𝑖?̅? stands for the “Lewis-type” turning 
point, with further progress in the innovation capabilities and the ensuing development process 
reducing instead of increasing inequality. 
Changing inequality very likely feedbacks on innovation dynamics giving rise to an 
endogenous cumulative process. The specific economic context we deal with, say the current level 
of inequality, its main causes, and the broad set of local institutions and rules driving economic 
agents’ decisions, relevantly influences how this process unfolds. Many different scenarios are 
possible.  
First, a kind of virtuous process may take place in which initially rising inequality may spur 
innovation. Both macro and micro mechanisms may be at work. At macro level, initial income and 
wealth concentration in a few hands may favor investment and capital accumulation, if the 
prevailing incentives are such that economic resources are reinvested in the real sector of the 
economy and in R&D activities, and “financial wheeling and dealing do not obstruct the industrial 
system through unsustainable share returns [and] short-term rather than long-term investment 
horizons (O’Hara, 2002, pp. 88 – 89)”. At micro level, Acemoglu, Robinson and Verdier (2012) 
stress the well-know idea that “technological innovations require incentives for workers and 
entrepreneurs [so that…] this implies greater inequality and greater poverty (and a weaker safety 
net) for a society encouraging innovation (Acemoglu, Robinson and Verdier, 2012, p.4)”. The 
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economic relationship then runs from (current) inequality to (current) innovation and may take a 
upward sloping form, as assumed by equation (2.a): 
  
𝑖𝑛𝑡 = 𝑔(𝑖𝑞𝑡⏟
+
)               (2.a) 
 
The steepness of equation (2.a) does matter. A flat and positively sloped equation (2.a) means that 
the existing institutional/economic framework stimulates economic actors to exploit the 
opportunities opened and respond to the incentives created by the initial rise in inequality. 
Accordingly, investment and innovative efforts will surge. Should equation (2.a) be rigid, this 
would represent a static economic environment, in which income and wealth concentration nether 
finance not incentivize innovation, and the ensuing social mobility and economic structural 
change.       
Despite of the arguments just outlined, the constant advancement in innovation capabilities 
requires the widespread diffusion of technological knowledge. Castellacci and Natera (2013) 
analyze a sample of 98 countries including both developed, emerging and underdeveloped 
economies in order to understand how innovation and absorption capacities evolve all along the 
building up of national innovation systems. They find out that innovation and absorption capacities 
are positively co-integrated in the prototype traverse of an economy from the initial state of 
underdevelopment and lack of innovation to the stage of fully advanced innovative countries. The 
diffusion of technological knowledge and the improvement of a country’s absorption capacities 
require significant households’ investments in higher education. These can take place only if a fair 
degree of equality is achieved within the economy.8 A second alternative scenario emerges with 
                                                          
8 See Galor and Zeira (1993, p. 51), on the “importance of having a large middle class for the purpose of [supporting] economic 
growth” through the ensuing larger opportunities to accumulate human capital. 
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respect to the previous one in which, from a certain point onwards, the economy will require a 
reduction in inequality to foster innovation even further. A backward-bending arm in the 
inequality-to-innovation relationship may emerge, as shown in equation (2.b):9  
 
𝑖𝑛𝑡 = 𝑔(𝑖𝑞𝑡⏟
+/−
)               (2.b) 
 
With  
𝜕𝑖𝑛𝑡
𝜕𝑖𝑞𝑡
> 0 if 𝑖𝑞𝑡 < 𝑖𝑞
∗; 
𝜕𝑖𝑛𝑡
𝜕𝑖𝑞𝑡
< 0 if 𝑖𝑞𝑡 > 𝑖𝑞
∗ 
          
Several developing economies show persistently high levels of income and wealth (originally land) 
inequality inherited from the past. This is the case of most Latin American countries, in which 
persistently high inequality is the outcome of the well-established monopolistic control of a few 
modern industrial and service sectors, as well as of abundant natural resources. In such a context, 
at macroeconomic level, high inequality impedes any significant innovation-driven structural 
change to take place and to radically modify the social structure of the economy (Furtado, 1964; 
Arocena and Sutz, 2003). Domestic industrialization is far from complete or is reverted by 
episodes of premature de-industrialization. The overreliance on natural resource exports fails to 
address recurrent external balance constrain problems. At social level, the room for innovation-
induced social mobility remains narrow. In our framework, a throughout negative relationship 
between inequality (iqt) and innovation (int) emerges, as assumed in equation (2.c):  
 
𝑖𝑛𝑡 = 𝑔(𝑖𝑞𝑡⏟
−
)              (2.c) 
                                                          
9 Following Hatipoglu (2012, p. 243), “firms tend to innovate more as a result of a decrease in inequality when inequality is too 
high […and] that there are significant non-linearities [between inequality and innovation] at mid- to high-range levels of 
inequality”. 
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Depending on the specific institutional setting that shapes the interaction between innovative 
efforts and inequality (i.e. how equation (1) matches with the alternative versions equation (2) may 
assume), a wide range of different development paths emerge in the innovation-inequality space. 
They are portrayed in Figures 2.a, 2.b and 2.c. 
Figure 2.a depicts the kind of virtuous interaction between inequality and innovation 
envisaged by Acemoglu et al. (2012). In Figure 2.a, point A stands for the kind of poverty trap that 
seems to afflict those backward economies in the bottom-left cluster in Figure 1. Point B, on the 
contrary, represents the high level of innovation capabilities developed by the advanced western 
economies and by a bunch of East Asian countries positioned on the rightward side of Figure 1. 
What is most, if the existing socio/economic context induces economic agents to respond 
vigorously to investment and innovation opportunities created by the degree of original 
(increasing) income and wealth concentration, the economy may move from point A to point B. A 
virtuous “technology traverse” and a successful development process take place, leading the 
economy to develop high innovation capabilities. 10 Consistently with Kuznets’ inverted U curve 
hypothesis, inequality first increases and then decreases along the unfolding of such a “happy-end” 
development process. 
 
[Figure 2.a] 
 
The development path described in Figure 2.a is only one among the several different evolutions 
an economy may follow. Indeed, no automatic forces exist causing a “meliorative trend” to take 
place. Rather, developing countries may find hard to replicate the successful development traverse 
                                                          
10 The formal conditions for such a virtuous process to take place read |
𝜕𝑖𝑛𝑡+1
𝜕𝑖𝑛𝑡
|
𝐴
= |
𝜕𝑔(.)
𝜕𝑓(.)
𝜕𝑓(.)
𝜕𝑖𝑛𝑡
|
𝐴
> 1; |
𝜕𝑖𝑛𝑡+1
𝜕𝑖𝑛𝑡
|
𝐵
=
|
𝜕𝑔(.)
𝜕𝑓(.)
𝜕𝑓(.)
𝜕𝑖𝑛𝑡
|
𝐵
< 1, and iqt=0 > iqA.  
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advanced economies historically went through. Following Furtado (1964), underdevelopment may 
well emerge as an autonomous self-feeding process instead of being the initial stage of an 
unavoidable move towards a fully developed innovative and more equalitarian economy. Figures 
2.b and 2.c display some alternative far less virtuous scenarios (than that portrayed in Figure 2.a).  
First, in Figure 2.b economic actors are insensitive to the opportunities created by the 
original low income and wealth concentration. Economic resources remain idle, productive 
investments low, and innovative efforts are absent. The lack of innovation eventually impedes the 
transition toward a highly dynamic and innovative economy, whilst it makes underdevelopment 
an enduring condition (see point A in Figure 2.b). 
Figure 2.c shows what we have labelled a perverse Latin American inequality-innovation 
pattern. Here, is the high level of initial inequality and the connected perverse functioning of local 
socio-economic institutions that impede any strongly innovative and more egalitarian economy to 
develop. The historical uneven distribution of economic resources and social opportunities 
characterizing Latin America eventually turns out as the most relevant obstacle to innovation and 
progress.  
[Figure 2.b] 
[Figure 2.c] 
 
3. Inequality, innovation and public investment in the US: An alternative story to the 
mainstream 
 
In the top-right part of Figure 1, the USA stands out as an outlier with respect to other advanced 
economies. On the one hand, they still perform well in terms of innovation. On the other hand, 
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inequality in the USA has increased hugely since mid 1970s, and it is now much higher than that 
registered in other developed countries.  
Acemoglu et al. (2012) interpret the current US inequality-innovation profile according to 
the well-know risk-incentive argument. Higher inequality is the price to pay in order to create an 
innovation-prone economic environment, since that larger income differentiation and increasing 
(relative) rewards reaped by innovators are the most powerful incentives to radical innovation. In 
this paper, we criticize such an interpretation of the current US inequality-innovation pattern both 
on a theoretical and empirical level.  
As to the theory, the heterodox evolutionary/institutionalist literature severely criticizes the 
mainstream approach to innovation that characterizes the analysis put forward by Acemoglu et al. 
(2012). First, innovation manifests itself as a fundamentally uncertain event, on which it is often 
impossible to build up any reliable probability distribution. Such a radical uncertainty implies that 
relative prices and unknown rewards can hardly guide strategic decisions of innovative firms. 
Second, innovation is a collective phenomenon that cumulates on the existing stock of knowledge 
(Cimoli et al., 2009). Innovation derives from the interaction between different stakeholders inside 
a given firm; from the interaction among firms in complex production networks; from the 
interaction between firms and public institutions such as universities and other public R&D 
agencies. Within this framework, we cannot stimulate innovation by simply adopting a more 
cutthroat remuneration system. Innovation depends on a much wider range of institutions, first and 
foremost those public institutions performing and/or financing breakthrough innovations that are 
too costly and uncertain to attract the interest of private actors. 
From an empirical point of view, Acemoglu et al. (2012) take the time evolution of patent 
counts (per million inhabitants) in a few industrialized countries in order to empirically back the 
supposed USA leadership in radical innovations with respect to other more equalitarian 
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economies. Their choice, however, is debatable. First, more patents do not necessarily mean more 
path-breaking innovations. Indeed, the relevant increase in US patents Acemoglu et al. (2012) 
observe may simply result from the spread of strategic behaviours aiming to protect firms’ 
knowledge from imitators, to create new rent opportunities, and to improve public perception of 
the innovative character of a given firm. Indeed, several analyses stress that the observed run to 
patent offices does not correspond to more innovation but may rather obstacle it, and that an 
increasing part of patented innovations by private corporations have negligible implications on the 
real economy, (Mazzoleni and Nelson, 1998; Mazzucato, 2013). Secondly, the allegedly positive 
relationship between rising inequality and increasing patents/innovation capacities may be the 
result of a spurious regression. These two phenomena appear as strictly related, but they are 
actually coincidental outcomes of changes affecting omitted institutional third variables. 
In this paper, we underpin such an alternative heterodox evolutionary/institutionalist 
perspective, which on the one hand connects the observed rise in inequality to the increasing 
financialization of the US economy, and on the other hand explains US innovation capabilities by 
taking into account the role of the so-called “entrepreneurial State”. 
Cypher (2003) well describes the process of financialization of the US economy by 
reporting the long list of financial innovations that, in the last three decades, have aimed at creating 
new (and riskier) credit opportunities, as well as at inflating stock prices on financial markets. 
Zalewski and Whalen (2010) show that the IMF financialization index reaches in the US the 
highest level worldwide. This reflects the extraordinary relevance of financial institutions such as 
investment banks, and the centrality of financial motives in guiding investment decisions of US 
corporations. 
Both heterodox institutionalist contributions (Zalewki and Whalen, 2010; Lazonick, 2013; 
Galbraith, 2012) and some more mainstream works (Piketty, 2014) see increasing inequality in the 
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US as a direct consequence of the financialization of the economy. The rise in top executives’ 
rewards due to the realization of astonishing capital gains explains a great deal of deeper income 
inequality in the US. This fact, in turn, has been favoured by the extensive deregulation of stock 
options and share buybacks, which has permitted top managers to speculate on financial markets 
and to manipulate equity prices for their own benefits. 
Besides this, the financialization of the US economy has led to the re-emergence of an 
economic environment that closely resembles that described by Veblen at the beginning of the 
previous century. Taking inspiration from Cypher (2003, p. 79) in his description of Veblen’s 
perspective on finance-driven economic organizations, the US currently works as an economy in 
which “the focal point had shifted: [the] traffic in vendible capital [as opposed to created and traded 
‘vendible products’] is the pivotal and dominant factor in the modern situation of business and 
industry”. Following Lazonick (2009), financialization and the diffusion of the “shareholder value-
orientation” ideology have induced the US business sector to move from an “old business model 
(OBM)” to a “new business” one (NBM).  
Under OBM, a central pillar of corporations’ management was the reinvestment of retained 
profits in R&D activities and in the accumulation of physical capital and technological knowledge. 
The main goal was the creation of value through in-house innovation taking the form of new 
higher-quality products and/or more efficient production processes. The results of innovation were 
distributed among firms’ stakeholders. On the one side, firms’ shareholders got dividends. On the 
other side, workers benefitted from higher real wages, stable employment, and career 
opportunities.  
In the “new business model (NBM)”, the search for capital gains on financial markets 
through large stock buybacks, and the distribution of sizeable dividends to shareholders have 
become the new mantra of top executives (Lazonick and Mazzucato, 2013).  
 [18] 
 
An expanding body of literature empirically demonstrates that, under NBM, corporations’ 
resources diverted towards financial markets may have crowded-out R&D activities and 
productive investments (Stockhammer, 2004; Orhangazi, 2008; van Treek, 2008; Milberg and 
Shapiro, 2013). Pollin (1996, p.55) emphasizes that “borrowed funds are used disproportionately 
to finance speculative and compensatory spending […rather than] to finance productive spending”, 
this fact exacerbating the instability and fragility of the US economy. This is also what emerges 
from Figures 3 – 8.11 Following Milberg and Shapiro (2013), Figure 3 shows the increasing interest 
of nonfinancial corporations in the accumulation of financial assets rather than productive ones. 
In Figure 4, we plot nonfinancial corporations’ R&D expenditures over internal funds against the 
total amount of dividends paid and share buybacks. On the one hand, dividends paid and share 
buybacks skyrocketed in the years preceding the worldwide financial crisis and quickly recovered 
in the aftermath. On the other hand, R&D expenditures decreased, although not monotonically, 
since the peak reached at the end of the dot.com bubble. Since the beginning of 2000s, an overall 
negative correlation equal to – 0,11 links productive investments in R&D to finance-oriented uses 
of internal funds.  
[Figure 3] 
[Figure 4] 
 
Beyond this, Arore et al. (2015) stress that the US private business sector has significantly changed 
how it allocates R&D expenditures between basic and applied research, and development. On the 
one hand, financialization-induced overemphasis on short-run profitability, together with 
globalization and heavier competition from emerging economies, China in particular, seem to have 
                                                          
11 In Figures 3-8, data on financial variables (i.e. dividends, share buybacks and nonfinancial corporations’ profits and internal 
funds) are taken from Federal Reserve Bank of Saint Louis’ flow of funds. Data on R&D expenditures are taken from US National 
Science Foundation. 
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led US corporations’ to focus on development and patenting. On the other hand, US corporations 
have considerably downsized basic and applied research, which is by definition far less 
remunerative in the short run. Figure 5 displays such diverging trends. Figure 6 also shows that, 
when US business total R&D expenditures (over profits) have increased in the last thirty years, 
during the run up to the “dot.com” crisis for instance, such increases mainly consisted in more 
development activities. No significant changes (or far less remarkable increases) took place as far 
as basic and applied research is concerned. 
[Figure 5] 
[Figure 6] 
 
Following Arora et al. (2015) and Singer (2014), these trends are of concern for the long-run 
evolution of the US economy. Basic and applied research provides economic actors with the 
technological knowledge on which product and process innovations eventually hinge on. 
Accordingly, the progressive disengagement of US firms from such activities may seriously 
endanger the US technological leadership and future productivity dynamics.  
In such a possibly gloomy scenario, it is worth wondering if US institutions may counteract 
such worrisome trends. Indeed, the institutionalist literature on the technological spill-overs of US 
government military expenditures, as well as on the “entrepreneurial State”, vigorously stresses 
how US public institutions played a crucial role in funding, nurturing and breeding innovation in 
the past. In the 1950s and in 1960s, US governmental agencies invested huge amount of resources 
to support and develop a widespread network of universities, research institutes, labs, firms and 
industrial consortia engaged in “beyond-the-horizon” research. Such efforts created the 
technological basis that has subsequently allowed for the introduction of myriads of innovations 
in the computer, software, information and communication, and biotech industry in the 1980s and 
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1990s. Most of the radical innovations in the those sectors would have never come to light without 
the initial big push provided by US public authorities. Although hidden under the rubric of defence 
expenditures and behind the rhetoric of market fundamentalism, a “Developmental Network State 
(Block, 2008)” has been effective and operative in the US as much as (or even more than) it was 
in many other developed economies (Lazonick, 2013; Mazzucato, 2013).  
In line with the neoliberal ideology, public authorities’ financing of R&D activities has 
decreased considerably since the end of the 1960s on. Whilst it amounted to 1,6 percent of US 
GDP in 1970, it was equal to 0,7 percent in 2014. No doubt, this trend is worrisome (Singer, 2014). 
Yet, some other facts may provide a more optimistic picture, and suggest that US public 
institutions can still play a role in feeding US technological improvements. Figure 7 shows that 
Federal financial obligations to support R&D activities have increasingly focused on basic and 
applied research, whilst much less emphasis has been given to development. In 2011, federal 
investments in basic research were more than 2 times higher than the corresponding figure for the 
private business sector (whilst they were equal to the 87 percent only in 1953), and represented 
almost the 70 percent of overall US expenditures in basic research. This fact may at least partially 
offset the opposite trends observed in the case of the US business sector. 12 Figure 8 shows the 
evolution through time of federal funds devoted to the Small Business Research Investment 
(SBIR) Program. In 2014, SBIR program still amounted to 2,2 billion dollars only, i.e. 0,02 percent 
of US GDP. Yet, in 2014 SBIR funds over GDP were more than twelve times higher than they 
were in 1983. Even further, the number of supported firms has increased seven fold. These trends 
are all the more important since that basic and applied research seems to have been increasingly 
                                                          
12 Following Block and Keller (2012) and Fontana et al. (2012), since 1970s records from annual awards acknowledged by R&D 
Magazine to the best 100 annual innovations show a remarkable increase in the share of prizes recognized to governmental 
organizations, spin-offs emanating from universities’ research centres, as well as collaborations including public institutions.           
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outsourced by large corporations to small and medium firms and start-up, which in turn need initial 
public support to develop their research programs. 
[Figure 7] 
[Figure 8] 
 
In terms of our simple theoretical framework, the financialization of the US economy entails 
multiple consequences on the prevailing inequality-innovation pattern, since that it directly affects 
inequality, as well as the allocation of corporations’ resources between unproductive financial 
purposes and productive investments. We portray such possible consequences in Figure 9. 
[Figure 9] 
 
First, in a highly financialized US economy, equation (1) may shift upwards. For any given level 
of innovation, the level of inequality inside the economy will be higher due to the current 
institutional setting and economic philosophy favouring an uneven distribution of economic 
resources, and of the output of innovative efforts, through financial market mechanisms.  
Second, financialization practices may radically reshape equation (2), i.e. the incentivizing 
or dis-incentivizing effects inequality may exert on innovation. In the virtuous scenario portrayed 
in Figure 2.a, we assumed a positive nexus connecting inequality to innovation. However, the 
arguments presented in this section suggest that the financialization of the US economy, and the 
ensuing exacerbating inequalities, may have a negative impact on innovation. First, the diffusion 
of financial practices diverting corporations’ resources away from R&D activities towards 
financial operations likely jeopardizes corporations’ ability to introduce new products with higher 
quality standards and at lower costs. Second, the polarization of economic resources and, 
consequently, of education, training and professional opportunities (see Piketty, 2014) can 
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obstacles the wide diffusion of technological competencies that are a prerequisite for the 
absorption and spread of innovations. In Figure 9, a throughout negative and leftward-displaced 
inequality-to-innovation nexus may emerge in the US (see the dashed grey downward-sloping 
line). This nexus closely resembles the perverse inequality-to-innovation relation that 
characterizes the highly unequal Latin American countries.13 
The final effect of these changes on the innovation performance of the US economy is 
possibly harsh. In Figure 9, the US economy might eventually move from the virtuous “old-
business-model” development path (point EOBM) to a far less favourable “future new business 
model” (point EFNBM). In point EFNBM, higher inequality does not contribute to better innovation 
performances. On the contrary, the US innovation capacity is significantly lower.  
The engagement of US public authorities in R&D activities might certainly mitigate and 
compensate such an undesirable outcome of the prevailing US business model. Indeed, the 
increasing US public authorities’ focus on basic and applied research, as well as more emphasis 
on the support of small innovative firms, may induce public involvement in innovation activities 
to perform the pro-active role it has historically played, and help the USA to maintain high US 
innovation performances even in presence of myopic strategies from the side of private businesses. 
In Figure 9, the positive effects of past and present public-funded R&D efforts on domestic 
innovation capabilities are mirrored by the position of equation (2). Although private sector forces 
might tend to shift it to the left, public innovation policies may contribute to preserve its rightward 
position (see the dashed black downward-sloping curve). Accordingly, the US economy might 
eventually follow a sort of “intermediate” development trajectory leading to point ENBM.  
What is most, contrary to the market-friendly perspective embraced by Acemoglu at al. 
(2012), Figure 9 portrays an economic scenario in which US innovation performances are not the 
                                                          
13 Following Palma (2011, p. 125), “with neo-liberal globalization, there is some distributional ‘Latin-contagion’ going on. It is 
fairly clear Latin America is now exporting some crucial features of its political settlement and distributional outcome in the US”. 
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result of free market forces and of a cutthroat remuneration system stimulating innovation. Current 
free market forces, as governed by the financialization of the US business sector, would rather 
jeopardize US innovation and, at the same time, increase inequality. It is the public support to 
innovation that may still play a fundamental role in order to contrast a private sector-driven decline 
in US innovation capacities. Following Singer (2014), should the neoliberal project of further 
downsizing public engagement in R&D activities be successful, such a decline might turn out to 
be inexorable.            
 
4. Conclusions 
 
The empirical literature on the relation between inequality and innovation is largely inconclusive. 
A brief cross-country analysis of inequality-innovation interactions reveals that a well-established 
universal pattern does not exist. The way inequality and innovation feedback among each other is 
likely country and context-specific. 
The very simple theoretical framework we present in this paper aims at describing at least 
part of such a huge heterogeneity in the inequality-innovation patterns characterizing different sets 
of countries. It also provides a different interpretation of the current US inequality-innovation 
pattern with respect to the well-known “(rising) inequality-feeds-(more) innovation” paradigm. 
Private business sector’s investments in the US are increasingly governed by financial purposes. 
The financialization of the US economy may both lead to higher inequality and, in the future, 
lower innovation. In the last decades, US public investments in R&D have partially compensated 
for the increasing disengagement of private corporations from basic and applied research. Public 
support to R&D may thus continue to play a decisive role to feed US innovation capabilities, like 
it did in the past. Accordingly, the neoliberal agenda aiming at squeezing any public participation 
 [24] 
 
to economic activities, R&D activities as well, represents a serious threat to the US technological 
leadership. 
Our analysis has relevant methodological implications. First, due to the pre-eminence local 
institutional factors have in shaping the mutual evolution of inequality and innovation, future 
analyses should adopt a context-specific perspective, and depart from searching for universal 
inequality-innovation rules. Case studies may help to grasp those specific factors that contribute 
to explain why some countries have been capable to ignite a virtuous development process leading 
to a highly innovative more egalitarian economy, while others have not. Second, private sectors’ 
innovation has been often the long-run indirect result of public investment in R&D activities 
undertaken several years, often decades, before. Public investment in innovative/path-breaking 
technologies takes a long time to payoff. If so, econometric analyses that try to ascertain how 
public R&D investments affect the innovative capabilities of the private sector may fail to provide 
a correct picture of the development of national innovation systems and of national innovation 
capacities. Econometric analysis, although important, must be integrated into a wider historical 
and anecdotal study of specific country-contextualized inequality-innovation patterns.                   
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Appendix A 
 
Table A.1 – List of 67 countries reported in Figure 1 (with corresponding code when explicit). 
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Figures 
Figure 1 – Current inequality (Gini Index) and innovation performance in 67 countries  
 
Source: Data on inequality from World Bank World Development Indicators dataset (2014) and OECD poverty and 
inequality indicators dataset. Data on GII from the 2012 Global Innovation Index Report. 
 
 
Figure 2.a – Virtuous dynamics in the inequality-innovation space 
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Figure 2.b – A (relatively) low inequality-low innovation trap 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.c – A Latin American-type high inequality-low innovation trap 
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Figure 3 – Nonfinancial US corporations’ financial assets over total assets, 1946 - 2014 
 
Source: Author’s own computation 
 
Figure 4 – Total nonfinancial corporations R&D expenditures, and dividends paid and share buybacks (as 
a share of internal funds), the US economy, 1946 – 2014. 
 
Source: Author’s own computation. 
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Figure 5 – US business expenditures on basic research (BR), applied research (AR) and 
development (D) as a share of total business R&D expenditures, 1953 – 2011.  
 
Source: Author’s own computation. 
 
Figure 6 – Composition of US business R&D expenditures over US Business profits, 1953 – 2011. 
 
Source: Author’s computation. 
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Figure 7 – Composition of Federal financial obligations in support of R&D activities, 1956 – 2014.  
 
Source: Author’s own computation. 
 
Figure 8 – Small Business Investment Research (SBIR) Program’s funds (over GDP) and number 
of firms financed, index numbers, 1983 – 2014. 
 
Source: Author’s own computation. 
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Figure 9 – Possible effects of financialization on inequality and innovation in the US 
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